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I. Introduction
A. Nature of the Problem:
Like soup du jour, intelligence is digested and maligned daily. Pundits label intelligence its own worst enemy. 1 Congress cites intelligence failure over success. 2 Media judgment is equally harsh. Tarnishing is either due to the intelligence chef or the customer not liking the menu or the meal. 3 Despite the pundits or the politics, the desire or the delivery, intelligence is identical to all Battle-space Operating Systems (BOS) as it provides unique capabilities to meet valid requirements. Within the intelligence BOS, there is human intelligence (HUMINT). It frequently fails. The question is why?
B. Thesis:
At the operational level, what are the two most important steps that the combatant commander must take to ensure effective and consistent HUMINT within his theater?
This paper argues that the combatant commander must co-locate HUMINT functions into a single staff of equal partnerships; and then align HUMINT assets into a common unity of effort. The first step overcomes broad differences in HUMINT focus, function and skill. It produces increased competence and effectiveness. The second step mitigates turf-driven and splintered HUMINT dynamics due to diverse organizations, jurisdictions, politics, and biases. It produces increased efficiency and operational-level payoffs.
C. Impact:
Effective and consistent HUMINT matters. When properly integrated, it shapes the operational battle-space, affects the actions of threat decision makers, and enhances the warfighter. It bears offensive and defensive attributes. It is the discipline of choice for peacekeeping operations, the global war on terrorism (GWOT), and non-traditional security threats. 4 HUMINT is used to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 5 It provides unique theater-strategic indicators, potential early warning, and force protection.
D. Thesis Demonstration and Roadmap:
This paper analyzes the divisive dynamics that impede effective and consistent HUMINT at the operational-level; all result from national structures and service-level realities. To set the national stage, it compares the management of SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT. It discusses ineffective HUMINT structures and consequences. To place HUMINT within an operational-level context, it applies two historical cases: the Double
Cross System (DCS) of World War II; and the CJ2X of Operation Joint Guard. 6 It then discusses lessons and application for the combatant commander in using a DCS or CJ2X.
HUMINT is not more important than signals intelligence (SIGINT) or imagery intelligence (IMINT). Each discipline requires full partnership with each other. This paper focuses on HUMINT. It provides a BOS appraisal of HUMINT dynamics and effectiveness. It is not an historical assessment. Although numerous disagreements exist, this paper also does not provide a broader treatise on controversial HUMINT issues at the national, service, or combatant commander levels.
II. Analysis

A. Setting the Intelligence Stage
Intelligence is inherently dynamic and volatile. It seeks prophecy as the truth changes; yet, it is not set free. Pressures never subside. Each discipline has unique strengths and weaknesses; and all remain formally united under Executive Order 12333.
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As a BOS, it is both a product and a process; while the product is transparent to the outsider; the process is distinct based on the intelligence discipline.
SIGINT and IMINT attempt a seamless approach; they push and pull intelligence depending on requirements and users. The National Security Agency (NSA) drives SIGINT and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) drives IMINT. These agencies centralize tasks, collection, and exploitation. This merging results in SIGINT and IMINT pride in authorship, not battle over ownership. Turf wars exist, but competition is typically focused against the threat. Technology links collection and dissemination. It is efficient. Multiple platforms offer depth of collection and analysis.
Risk is low and response time is relatively quick. Everybody benefits -the collector, the producer, and the consumer.
In HUMINT, the source is usually more important than the product. Ownership of the asset becomes more important than authorship of the product. The German threat created a crisis and crisis produced change. MI5 had limited capabilities, constrained jurisdictions, and structures unable to deal with it. In response, it created the "Twenty Committee." Based on the Roman numerals "XX", it became known as the DCS. 30 Within MI5, Sir John C. Masterman chaired DCS. 31 He "was a
[an Oxford] university don and an enthusiastic cricketer. His mind was tuned to the pitch of the ball in this sport whose hazards were so real and whose rewards were so immense." 32 He used finesse and strategy to achieve DCS objectives. In terms of culture and doctrine, Americans prefer to fight wars decisively. They pay homage to the God of the "Quick Decisive Victory" regardless of threat. The DCS approach sounds appealing, it just takes too long. American culture and politics also require public progress and precise proof. The current American approach to GWOT mirrors this point: capture a terrorist cell; go public with names, numbers and next of kin. While issues concerning oversight and collection activities remain vitally important, battles over who is responsible for aligning HUMINT functions and assets should not.
Let us assume for a moment that a modern-day DCS could exist. Where would it serve? Would it face similar challenges as the DCS? Could it produce similar results?
One does not have to look far for a modern day scenario with a crisis action environment, elusive threats, high political expectations and HUMINT organizational chaos. In this case, operational necessity and combatant commander leadership also made a difference.
The setting is Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the mission is peacekeeping.
III. How Do We Solve This Problem and is it Relevant Today?
A. Immediately prior to TOA, an operational-level HUMINT force protection asset located throughout Bosnia was chopped to three subordinate units. This unit went from being a vital theater-level asset into a hollow tactical asset owned by subordinate units.
The question is why? In terms of HUMINT staffs, theater CA functions were controlled by a handful of ARRC specialists who assisted LANDCENT. Theater CI existed in isolation. Theater security personnel were in near anarchy and overwhelmed with processing contractor and civilian access badges, travel rights, law enforcement issues and ADP security. These three principal HUMINT staffs had five separate reporting channels, a total of eleven subordinate sections, no cohesion, and tremendous talent.
Even a casual observer could drive a truck through these functional seams.
On the requirements management (RM) side, HUMINT sources were being double and tripled tasked, often on the same day. 48 HUMINT existed in isolation from the remainder of the CJ2 and SFOR staffs. Each nation also had its own objectives, its own collectors, and its own strategy. HUMINT coordination was ineffective. HUMINT politics and turf wars dominated the scene. It lacked a central purpose, a unity of effort, a cohesive organization, and a functioning staff. Like the mythical seven-headed Hydra, it had multiple egos, an enormous appetite, and no finesse. It did not counter the threat.
As a result of this disarray, SFOR effected two critical HUMINT changes. The first step created the CJ2X. It consisted of security, RM, tasking, and analysis. Each section focused at the operational level. IFOR lessons learned, under either American or British auspices, also affected CJ2X structure. 49 In retrospect, the CJ2X mirrored the DCS framework; however, that was never the intent. 50 Nevertheless, the process to create equal and aligned partnerships among staff functions and then align theater assets was identical to that of the DCS. as, National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). 51 Today, despite innumerable staff rotations and leader transitions, the CJ2X is still effectively engaged in Sarajevo.
B. DCS and CJ2X Similarities
Neither the DCS nor the CJ2X changed HUMINT ownership; they just better aligned the approach. They also desired an outcome based on teamwork. Neither was naïve. They also fully understood HUMINT organizational and human dynamics; the goal was to balance the clout of each function. In one fell swoop, the DCS and the CJ2X tackled organization, mindset, and ego. Each broke down internal barriers. Both knew the importance of having multi-disciplined intelligence and a community-wide effort.
The DCS and CJ2X used finesse to work through turf and jurisdiction issues. They aligned minimized HUMINT weakness. They mitigated barriers and increased payoffs.
The DCS and CJ2X both grew out of operational necessity and active leadership.
Both were conceived in crisis. They earned the credibility of the combatant commander, created a singular strategy, and then executed the plan. Both DCS and CJ2X faced significant obstacles; yet, moved operational HUMINT into a productive arena. Both DCS and CJ2X evolved from theater-level crisis, threats, and requirements. Both rose from near chaos, internal disarray, and external isolation. Each had adequate staffing; yet no unity of purpose or effort. Both used functions, assets, and talent at hand. They joined skills and targeted adversary intelligence services and non-traditional threats. it accomplishes the mission through control and coordination (not command and control).
Even so, HUMINT must serve a central decision maker and operate within that leader's decision making cycle. Is all operational-level HUMINT working for the same boss?
Third, to achieve success before, during, and after the operation, HUMINT must fully integrate with operations, targeting, and other intelligence assets. This triad is based on command guidance, the mission, and situation. Is HUMINT embedded within the triad?
Fourth, despite structures and jurisdictions, egos and mindsets, constraints and talent, HUMINT must evolve due to the threat and the requirement. Is HUMINT flexible?
IV. Conclusion
A. Lesson Learned
HUMINT is designed to support the decision-maker and then the warfighter. Due to national structures and turf wars, it starts at a significant disadvantage in each area.
When compared to SIGINT or IMINT, it lacks technology, timing, and delivery. When it comes to control and coordination, there managers outweigh assets. If HUMINT functions become isolated, seams are exploited. When HUMINT elements drift further apart due to crisis and change, gaps between these agencies are also exploited.
The end of operational-level HUMINT is timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence within the decision making cycle of the combatant commander. To achieve this end, HUMINT must attempt to align its ways and means. For reasons of politics, jurisdiction, mindsets, mirror-imaging, egos, and divided organizations, this alignment is a very difficult proposition for HUMINT. While it is not likely that the combatant will command all the HUMINT assets in his area of responsibility; he must certainly control them and mitigate the dynamics which divide them. To achieve objectives, combatant commanders must align HUMINT skills, resources, and talents. Both DCS and CJ2X
understood the complex realities of HUMINT organizational and human dynamics. They still achieved desired combatant commander success through finesse and partnership.
Operational-level assets should focus on operational-level tasks. The commander sets the priority; HUMINT must build the theater intelligence picture. Thus, HUMINT requires horizontal, as well as, vertical integration. As demonstrated by the DCS,
HUMINT is not just a collector; it can effect change, effect the movement of threat forces, affect threat decision makers, and serve as a force-multiplier. As evidenced by the CJ2X, the dichotomous nature of HUMINT has not changed. Nevertheless, a DCStype staff can also succeed in multi-national environments and mitigate HUMINT dynamics.
B. Possible Implications for Future Employment
The DCS and CJ2X also provide viable models for countering non-traditional threats, terrorists, and organized criminals in five main regards. First, the DCS and CJ2X joined efforts with law enforcement, CA, CI, analysis, and collection. Second, they broke traditional bureaucratic molds. Third, they increased effectiveness and efficiency.
They reduced risk. Fourth, they joined skills and mind sets, mitigated organizational seams, and aligned output. Fifth, they put egos aside and got to work.
Today, the new Department of Homeland Security and the long-term nature of the GWOT threat also apply to the DCS and CJ2X. Each dealt with non-templated threats, to include terrorists, extremists, intelligence services, arms smugglers, illegal residents, border crossers, intelligence collectors, and criminals. These threats were extremely difficult to identify, track, control, and exploit. Nevertheless, it was done. Both the DCS and CJ2X had long-term strategies to control and then exploit the threat. Neither was driven by short-term rewards; they focused on long-term payoff. Today, after some six years of peacekeeping, the CJ2X continues its effort.
Terrorism, post 9/11, is not likely to go away. It will most likely grow. To counter this threat, an integrated and aligned partnership of HUMINT and entire intelligence community assets is required. The threat paradigm has again changed; the threat is more sophisticated. On 9/11, it exploited our security seams. It exploited organizational seams based on functions, organizations, and relationships. Will HUMINT bureaucracy change in response? Due to its dynamics, can it?
C. Combatant Commander's Role
The combatant commander must strongly consider the HUMINT lessons that the DCS and the CJ2X provide. Collective HUMINT strengthens the process and product. If combined, a strong defense allows for a strong offense. The DCS and CJ2X joined functions and mitigated barriers. At the operational level, the combatant commander's role and approach is clear; he must co-locate HUMINT functions into a single staff of equal partnerships; and then align HUMINT assets into a common unity of effort. The first step results in increased HUMINT competence and effectiveness. The second step mitigates HUMINT politics and structural gaps. If properly aligned, HUMINT matters.
